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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 860069 
vs. : 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Phillip Paul Larocco, was charged with theft 
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 and § 76-6-412 (1978), and 
possession of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1981). Defendant was 
convicted as charged in a jury trial held December 9-10, 1985, in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Dee on January 10, 1986, to 
concurrent terms of one to fifteen and zero tp five years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 16, 1981, defendant approached salesman David 
Luce at State Auto Sales in Salt Lake City and asked to take a 
1973 Mach I Mustang for a test drive (R. 186). Defendant had 
visited Mr. Luce at State Auto Sales on two previous occasions, 
and on each of those occasions they had discussed Mustangs for 
about 10-15 minutes (R. 187-88). Because t h i s was the th i rd time 
he had met defendant and because there were no other employees a t 
the car l o t a t tha t time, Mr. Luce permitted defendant to take 
the car for an unaccompanied t e s t drive (R. 186-87). Mr. Luce 
told defendant tha t he could take the car around the block, 
however defendant drove off and never returned (R. 187-88). 
Later that day, William Padi l la f the owner of Sta te Auto Sales , 
reported to the police tha t the Mustang had been stolen (R. 211). 
Shortly the rea f t e r , defendant was incarcerated in the 
Utah Sta te Prison, having been convicted of an unrelated thef t of 
a truck valued a t $80,000 (R. 349). Defendant was released from 
prison on February 12, 1985 (R. 348-49).* 
In May of 1985, salesman David Luce, who had changed 
jobs and was working a t Valley Ford in Sa l t Lake City, Sciw 
defendant a t Valley Ford. Defendant was on the showroom floor 
ta lk ing with a salesman named Patr ick Sul l ivan. Mr. Luce took 
Mr. Sull ivan aside and sa id , MIf tha t gentleman wants t o go for 
a r ide in a car , . • • you j u s t make damn sure you go with him, 
because if you don ' t , y o u ' l l not see him again ." (R. 190). 
Defendant had given Mr. Sul l ivan a fa lse name, P h i l l i p Wilson, 
and had said tha t he l ived a t 7442 Gardenia Avenue, a s t r e e t 
number which did not ex i s t (R. 31 , 192, 214). 
1 Defendant's incarcera t ion in the Utah Sta te Prison was not 
brought to the a t t en t ion of the jury a t t r i a l . The 
incarcera t ion , however, i s an important factor to consider in 
determining whether defendant in t h i s case could be convicted 
both of theft and possession of a s to len veh ic le , pee infra t h i s 
brief Point IV a t p. 29. 
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About three or four days l a t e r , Mr* Luce saw defendant 
at 39th South and State S t r e e t , driving the Mustang that he had 
s to l en from State Auto Sa les in 1981 (R. 191) . Mr* Luce ca l l ed 
h i s former employer William Padi l la and to ld him that he had seen 
the s t o l e n Mustang, and Mr* Luce gave Padi l la the name and 
address that defendant had given to the salesman at Valley Ford 
(R. 190-92, 214) . Mr. Padi l la could not find the s t r e e t number 
that had been given him by Mr. Luce. However, Mr. Padi l la saw 
the Mustang parked on the s t r e e t a few blocks away (R. 215) . Mr. 
Padi l la wrote down the c a r ' s l i c e n s e number and ca l l ed the po l i ce 
(R. 215, 230) . 
A few days l a t e r , Deputy Linda Robison went t o the 
l o c a t i o n where Padi l la had seen the Mustang (R. 230-31) . Deputy 
Robison found the Mustang parked in front of defendant's home 
and, checking the l i c e n s e p l a t e , she found th^t the car was 
reg i s tered to defendant (R. 232-33) . Deputy Robison checked the 
v e h i c l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number ["VINM] that was l i s t e d in the 
1 
c a r ' s r e g i s t r a t i o n and found that the VIN came from a 1973 
Mustang reg i s tered to Mr. Neil Hailes (R. 233) | .2 
On June 6, 1985, Deputy Robison returned t o the 
neighborhood where the 1973 Mustang was parked, accompanied t h i s 
time by another o f f i cer and by Kip Ingerso l l from the Department 
of Motor Vehicles (R. 234). Standing outs ide the v e h i c l e , the 
o f f i c e r s examined the VIN tag on the dashboard, which 
2 Mr. Hai les ' Mustang had been t o t a l l e d in a c^r wreck that 
occurred on Christmas Eve of 1975, and the wrecked remains of 
that car were kept at a junk yard in Sa l t Lake County (R. 250-
5 5 ) . 
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corresponded t o that of Mr* Hailes 1 Mustang. The pol ice then 
opened the door of the car and looked a t the VIN located on the 
safety standard s t i c k e r located on the ins ide edge of the door. 
This VIN was d i f f e r e n t from the VIN on the dashboard and matched 
the VIN of the Mustang s t o l e n from State Auto S a l e s (R. 235) . 
Upon f inding that the VIN on the safety standard 
s t i cker matched that of the s t o l e n Mustang, the o f f i c e r s went t o 
defendant's home, read him h i s Miranda r i g h t s , and placed him 
under arrest (R. 238-40) . Defendant claimed that he had bought 
the Mustang from Streator Chevrolet (R. 33) . 
Upon further i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Officer Ingerso l l found 
that the VIN tag on the dashboard was fraudulent (R. 268)» 
Normally VIN tags are r iveted on, but the dashboard VIN in the 
Mustang was af f ixed with glue and t i n f o i l (R. 270-71) . Officer 
Ingerso l l a l so examined a "secret , der ivat ive" s e r i a l number 
located under one of the Mustang's fenders and found that t h i s 
s e r i a l number matched the VIN of the Mustang s t o l e n from State 
Auto Sales (R. 271-72, 276). 
At t r i a l , defendant did not deny that the Mustang had 
been s t o l e n , but attempted to convince the jury that Mr. Luce had 
mis ident i f i ed him as the man who had s t o l e n the car from State 
Auto S a l e s . He a l so argued that he did not know that the car was 
s t o l e n (R. 310-13 , 349) . 
The jury convicted defendant of thef t and of possess ion 
of a s to l en veh ic l e (R. 325) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
After a complete hear ing on whether t h e b r i e f c o n t a c t 
between a juror and one of the S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s could have 
a f f e c t e d t h e outcome of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , Judge Dee proper ly 
den ied d e f e n d a n t s motion for a m i s t r i a l . 
Because defendant had no l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n of 
pr ivacy i n the v e h i c l e he s t o l e , he has no s tand ing t o c h a l l e n g e 
t h e a l l e g e d search of t h a t v e h i c l e . Assuming defendant has 
s tand ing t o c o n t e s t the s e a r c h , no reasonab le e x p e c t a t i o n of 
pr ivacy e x i s t s in t h e VIN, and f u r t h e r , probable cause e x i s t e d t o 
search the v e h i c l e w i thout a warrant . 
The record does not support d e f e n d a n t ' s c la im t h a t t h e 
jury observed him in s h a c k l e s , thus denying him a f a i r t r i a l . 
Under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the p r e s e n t c a s e , i t was 
proper for the jury t o c o n v i c t defendant of both t h e f t of an 
o p e r a b l e motor v e h i c l e and p o s s e s s i o n of a s t o l e n v e h i c l e . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
SHORT CONTACT BETWEEN A JUROR AND ONE OF 
THE STATE'S WITNESSES DID NOT WARRANT THE 
GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MIS-
TRIAL. 
Defendant contends that Judge David ti. Dee committed 
revers ib l e error by denying h i s motion for a m i s t r i a l , af ter i t 
was discovered that juror Agnes Lembke had conversed with wi tness 
Nei l Ha i l e s . Both the State and defendant agree that the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Pike f 712 P. 2d 277 (Utah 1985) 
i s c r i t i c a l in deciding the present i s s u e . 
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According t o the standard s e t forth in State v. Pike. 
an unauthorized encounter between a witness and a juror that i s 
"more than brief and inadvertant" r a i s e s a presumption of 
prejudice to the defendant which must be rebutted by the S t a t e . 
Id . at 280. If , however, the encounter i s merely brief and 
inadvertent , the defendant must show that actual prejudice 
resulted from the contact . I d . Defendant's present argument can 
be dismissed both on grounds that the S ta te rebutted any 
presumption of prejudice to defendant and on grounds that , s ince 
the contact was brief and inadvertent , defendant's f a i l u r e to 
prove actual prejudice precludes h i s succeeding on t h i s i s s u e . 3 
The record of the proceedings below r e f l e c t s that j u s t 
prior to t r i a l , after the jury had been s e l e c t e d , some of the 
jurors were wait ing outs ide the courtroom.4 Mr. Hai les walked 
over to where Agnes Lembke was s i t t i n g in order to share an 
ashtray that she was using (R. 164-65) . A br ie f , "general 
conversation" ensued in which Mr. Hai les t o l d Mrs. Lembke that he 
planned to go to Eureka and hoped that the t r i a l would not l a s t 
too long (R. 164-65) . Mr. Hailes a l s o expressed surprise that 
3 I t i s not c lear from the record whether Judge Dee denied 
defendant's motion for a mi s t r ia l on the grounds that the State 
had rebutted the presumption of prejudice to defendant, or on 
grounds that the juror-witness contact was brief and inadvertant , 
and no actual prejudice was shown. However, t h i s Court should 
affirm the rul ing of the t r i a l court if there i s any proper 
grounds for doing s o , even though the t r i a l court did not ass ign 
that reason for i t s ru l ing , gee f e . g . . S ta te v. Ga l l egos , 712 
P. 2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985) . 
4 The record of the inquiry made by the t r i a l court regarding Ms. 
Lembke's contact with Mr. Hai les i s reproduced in i t s e n t i r e t y in 
the addendum to t h i s brief at appendix A. 
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none of the jurors had raised t h e i r hands when asked whether they 
bel ieved that po l i ce o f f i c e r s were more be l ievable than other 
w i tnes se s , and Hai les indicated that he would probably have 
raised h i s hand had he been asked that question (R. 166) • 
Nothing further appears t o have been said between the two. 
I t i s c lear from the record that Judge Dee had studied 
the ruling in State v. Pike and was aware that , where juror/ 
witness contact i s more than merely i n c i d e n t a l , the State must 
rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant (see R. 334-
35) . I t i s a lso clear that the State rebutted t h i s presumption 
(R. 338-42) . Factors from which the t r i a l court could reasonably 
have concluded that there was no prejudice to defendant include 
the fo l lowing. 
F i r s t , a major d i s t i n c t i o n between the present case and 
Pike l i e s in the nature of the testimony offered by the witnesses 
who had come i n t o contact with jury members. Unlike the c r i t i c a l 
testimony offered by the po l i ce o f f i cer in Pike,5 Mr. Hai les 1 
testimony was v i r t u a l l y inconsequential to the outcome of the 
present case . His testimony a s s i s t e d the S ta te in e s t a b l i s h i n g 
5 In g t a t e v. Pike the court s tressed that Officer Fleming, the 
policeman who mingled and conversed with three jurors , was an 
"important prosecution w i t n e s s . " 712 P. 2d at 280. Pike involved 
convic t ions on three counts of aggravated a s s a u l t , and there was 
c o n f l i c t i n g testimony regarding the events that had transpired at 
the scene of the crime. Officer Fleming "was both the arres t ing 
o f f i c e r at the scene of the a l t e r c a t i o n , " and he heard the 
defendant make incriminating statements to the e f f e c t that he 
would "take care of" h i s a s s a u l t v i c t ims . Xd. at 279-80. 
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that the Mustang parked in front of d e f e n d a n t s home was s t o l e n , 6 
but t h i s fac t was never disputed at t r i a l . Defendant conceded 
that the car was s t o l e n (R. 312-13) but claimed that David Lucef 
the salesman from State Auto S a l e s , had mis ident i f i ed him as the 
man who had taken the v e h i c l e (R. 310-12) . Defendant a l s o argued 
that he did not know that the car was s to len (R. 313) . The 
substance of Mr. Hai les ' testimony was never challenged. As 
counsel for the State noted, Mr. Hai les was an "incidental 
witness" whose testimony "simply rounded out the story so that 
the jury would get the en t i re p i c ture ." (R. 341) . Mr. Hai les 
was not the v ic t im in t h i s case , he had never met nor been 
wronged by t h i s defendant, he was never at the scene of the 
crime, and he did not appear to have any i n t e r e s t in the outcome 
of the case . Even under the worst imaginable scenario—had Agnes 
Lembke become pass ionate ly devoted t o be l iev ing everything Mr. 
Hai les sa id—at most, Ms. Lembke would have been led to b e l i e v e 
one fact that was never in d ispute . Under these circumstances, 
Judge Dee could reasonably have concluded that the contact 
between Juror Lembke and Witness Hai les was not prejudic ia l to 
defendant. 
Defendant expresses concern over Mr. Hailes' statement 
to the effect that, had he been asked, he would have told the 
court that he thought police officers were more credible than 
6 The police investigation established that the VIN tag that had 
been glued to the dashboard of the car possessed by defendant 
came froma Mustang that had belonged to Mr. Hailes (R. 233). Mr. 
Hailes testified that in 1973 he purchased a new Mustang Mach I 
and, on Christmas Eve of 1975, he had been drinking and drove his 
car off the highway, demolishing it beyond repair (R. 2f>0-55). 
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other wi tnesses . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Mr, Hailes was not an expert 
wi tness , or an authority f igure , whose personal opinion regarding 
wi tness c r e d i b i l i t y was l i k e l y to have carried much weight with 
the juror to whom spoke. From the juror ' s perspect ive , Neil 
Hai les was simply a fe l low who had gotten drunk one night and 
crashed h i s 1973 Mach I Mustang. And more importantly, the 
testimony of the two pol ice o f f i c e r s who t e s t i f i e d in t h i s case , 
l i k e that of Mr. Hailes himself, was never disputed. Off icers 
Linda Robison and Kip Ingerso l l es tabl i shed that the VIN tag 
glued to the dash area of the Mustang was fraudulent, that the 
car was s t o l e n , and that the defendant admitted that the v e h i c l e 
was in h i s possess ion (see R. 230-49, 265-86) . Nothing that the 
o f f i c e r s sa id , however, detracted from defendant's claims that he 
had been mis ident i f i ed as the thief of the v e h i c l e and that he 
had not known that the car was s t o l e n . Because po l ice o f f i c er 
c r e d i b i l i t y was never an i s s u e in the present case , the t r i a l 
court had further reason t o conclude that defendant had not been 
prejudiced by anything that Mr. Hai les had said to Ms. Lembke. 
Another important d i s t i n c t i o n between Pike and the 
present case i s that here the relevant matters were f u l l y aired 
in the court below. In Piker the Court expressed i t s concern 
that the "questioning [of the o f f i c er who conversed with three 
jurors during a recess ] was brief and did not d i s c l o s e the e n t i r e 
contents of the conversat ion." 712 P.2d at 280. In the judge's 
chambers, the po l ice o f f i cer in Pike began t o t e l l the t r i a l 
court of the d i scuss ion with the jurors ; that , among other 
t h i n g s , he and the jurors had discussed the o f f i c e r ' s acc ident . 
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However, the court interrupted the o f f i c e r , and the o f f i cer was 
never allowed to f i n i s h h i s narrative of the conversat ion, i d . 
a t 279. Beyond t h i s , there was "no other evidence as t o the 
scope and subject matter of the conversation. " Id. at 280. I t 
appears t o have been a c r i t i c a l factor in the Court's reversal of 
the Pike convic t ion , that from the incomplete record a v a i l a b l e , 
neither the Supreme Court nor the t r i a l court could properly have 
concluded that defendant Pike had not been prejudiced by the 
encounter between the o f f i c er and the jurors . Such d e f i c i e n c i e s 
were not present in the ins tant case . Juror Lembke was 
questioned in considerable d e t a i l by the t r i a l court , by counsel 
for the S t a t e , and by counsel for defendant (see Appendix A). 
Neither party had any further quest ions for Ms. Lembke. She sa id 
a l l that she could say, and the record adequately supports the 
conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced. 
Moreover, while they were not e n t i r e l y d i s p o s i t i v e , Ms. 
Lembke1s statements t o the court were s i g n i f i c a n t . She sa id that 
she and Mr. Hai les had not discussed the f a c t s of the case a t a l l 
(R. 165 ) . She declared that she would remain unbiased towards 
e i ther s i d e , that she would not accord any greater weight to Mr. 
Hai les 1 testimony than t o that of other w i t n e s s e s , and that the 
comment regarding the testimony of po l i ce o f f i c e r s would not 
a f f ec t her de l ibera t ions in any way (R. 168) . Judge Dee, who 
observed Ms. Lembke's demeanor as she answered the quest ions put 
t o her , was uniquely capable of determining whether or not she 
had been influenced by the contact with Mr. H a i l e s , and h i s 
conclusion that there was no need t o grant a mi s t r ia l was 
proper. 
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Stretching t o i t s utmost dictum foi^nd in Pike regarding 
the danger that juror-witness contact might have subt le 
psychological e f f e c t s , defendant claims that i t i s "obviously . . 
• very d i f f i c u l t " to rebut the presumption of prejudice once i t 
has ar i s en . Defendant impl ies that the presumption of prejudice 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y i r rebut tab le . (See Brief of Appellant at 11.) 
The Sta te i s confident that the Supreme Court did not intend for 
i t s dec i s ion in Pike to be interpreted so extremely. The 
presumption i s a rebuttable one, and in t h i s case there i s 
abundant record evidence that the presumption was in fact 
rebutted. 
As noted above, the Court indicated in Pike that , i f 
contact between a juror i s brief and inadvertent , the defendant 
must demonstrate that he has suffered actual prejudice . The 
exact meaning of the term "brief and inadvertent" i s not c l e a r , 
but t h i s descr ipt ion would seem to f i t the encounter between Ms. 
Lembke and Mr. Hai les in the present case. Their d i scuss ion 
appears t o have l a s t e d only a few moments, and i t was cer ta in ly 
not by design that the two found themselves i n t h e hallway using 
the same ashtray. Judge Dee seemed convinced that the ir exchange 
was merely a "question of f r i e n d l i n e s s " between strangers (R. 
165) . Because defendant has not shown any actual prejudice , and 
because the contact between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes could be 
characterized as brief and inadvertent , t h i s Court has a second 
ground for re jec t ing defendant's argument. 
The type of contact that occurred between Ms. Lembke 
and Mr. Hai les should be avoided. The t r i a l court wise ly took 
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measures to preclude the occurrence of such contacts in the 
future (see R. 165) . The S ta te f however, rebutted the 
presumption prejudiced in the present case and Defendant1& 
argument should be re jec ted . 
Defendant claims that Mr. Hailes conversed with two -
jurors and that he was prejudiced by the t r i a l cour t ' s f a i l u r e to 
quest ion the second of these two jurors . There are at l e a s t two 
reasons why t h i s portion of defendant's argument should be 
re jec ted . 
F i r s t , i t i s c lear from the record that t h i s second 
juror—a young, unnamed, blonde-haired woman who had been s i t t i n g 
next to Ms. Lembke—was not present when the encounter between 
Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hai les took p lace . Ms. Lembke to ld Judge Dee, 
"The g i r l s i t t i n g next t o me there . As he [Mr. Hai les] was 
walking up to use the ashtray, she l e f t , and he used the ashtray" 
(R. 167) . Ms. Lembke added that "she l e f t j u s t as he was walking 
by." (R. 167) . If there was any contact at a l l between Mr. 
Hai les and the blonde juror, which there probably was not , i t was 
brief and inadvertant. Since defendant has not produced any 
evidence that he was ac tua l l y prejudiced by the brief contact 
that might poss ibly have occurred between Mr. Hai les and the 
second juror, any argument he may make r e l a t i v e to t h i s second 
juror i s m e r i t l e s s . £jee State v. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 ( i f 
contact i s brief and inadvertant , defendant must show actual 
pre jud ice ) . 
Second, the court below and counsel for both part i e s 
appeared to have been s a t i s f i e d that there was no need to 
- 1 2 -
question any juror other than Ms. Lembke (see R. 164-69). If 
defendant believed that this second juror had been in contact 
with Mr. Hailes and should be questioned, defendant should have 
moved that the court bring the juror forward for questioning, 
thus clearing the air of any impropriety. He did not do so, 
however, and his failure to make a timely objection below, 
precludes his raising this issue on appeal. State v. Steggell, 
660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). 
POINT II 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
WAS LAWFUL AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT 
OF THE SEARCH | 
A. DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE. 
As defendant points out in his brief, the right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures lis personal in 
nature and can be asserted only by one whose rights are so 
violated. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 1^8 (1978); State v. 
Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). An individual has standing to 
object to the lawfulness of a search only if be has a "legitimate 
expectation of privacy" in the item or premises searched. Rakas 
v. Illinois. 439 U.S. at 143. 
The courts overwhelmingly agree that criminal 
defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
vehicles they have stolen. For example, the Arizona Supreme 
Court has declared, "A thief of property has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in stolen goods. And •this court has 
refused to recognize as "reasonable" any expectation of privacy 
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a thief may have in an automobile which he has stolen.1" state 
v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383, 396 (1983) , ££1^ 
denied, U.S. , 104 S.Ct 1017 (1983) (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant, who has not 
shown that he "owned or had a right to possess" a car, has no 
stanaing to challenge the constitutionality of its search and 
seizure. State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P. 2d 1093, 1095 
(1981). Accord State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570, 
573 (1984). And the Colorado Supreme Court has held, "Since the 
evidence here strongly points to the fact that the defendant 
stole this vehicle, it must be concluded that he has no 
propriety or possessory interest in the vehicle upon which he can 
base standing to challenge the legality of its search." People 
v. Pearson, 190 Colo. 313, , 546 P.2d 1259, 1264 (1976). See 
also Sanborn v. State, 257 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983) 
(defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in stolen 
car); State v. Rivers, 420 So.2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1982) (because 
vehicle was stolen, defendants "had no appropriate proprietary 
interest in that automobile, they had no reason to expect any 
privacy, and there was absolutely nothing wrong with the 
warrantless search"); Graham v. State, 47 Md.App. 287, , 421 
A. 2d 1385, 1390 (1980) (defendant had no standing to object to 
search of stolen moped and backpack); Burns v. State, 43B So.2d 
1347, 1351 (Miss. 1983) (Defendants claim of unlawful search 
rejected, "because the marijuana was found in a stolen automo-
bile"); State v. White, 311 N.C. 238, , 316 S.E.2d 42, 46 
(1984) ("defendant had no legitimate expectations of privacy in 
the stolen vehicle")• 
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Moreover both the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
S t a t e s Supreme Court have held that defendants did not have 
standing t o object t o the search of v e h i c l e s that they did not 
r i g h t f u l l y possess . In a l l three of the Utah cases c i t ed by 
defendant—State v. Valdez, 689 P. 2d 1334 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Purce l l , 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); and State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 
2d 38 f 414 P.2d 958 (1966)—this Court denied standing t o 
ind iv idua l s who did not properly possess the v e h i c l e s searched by 
p o l i c e . And in Rakas v. I l l i n o i s y the United S ta te s Supreme 
Court denied standing to the defendant on the same grounds. 439 
U.S. at 148. 
In the present case , upon being arres ted , defendant 
to ld the po l i ce that the 1973 Mustang was not s t o l e n , that he 
bought the car from Streator Chevrolet. Although he had ample 
opportunity to do so in the proceeding below, defendant never 
e s tab l i shed that h i s claims had any leg i t imacy. Testimony given 
by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress evidence on 
Fourth Amendment grounds cannot be admitted in evidence against 
the defendant at t r i a l on the i s sue of g u i l t unless the defendant 
makes no object ion . Simmons v. United S t a t e s , 390 U.S. 377 
(1968). Thus, defendant had the opportunity t^ > be completely 
open at the p r e - t r i a l hearing and not have the evidence used 
against him. Instead i t seems c lear from the record that 
defendant's claims that he bought the car were merely the l i e s of 
one who has been caught red-handed with s to len goods. Defendant 
contends, however, that h i s unsubstantiated claim of ownership 
automatical ly e n t i t l e s him to standing and that he had no 
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obligation to establish the validity of his claim. This argument 
has no merit. 
First, it would appear that under the rule of virtually 
every court in this nation today, evidence resulting from a 
police search is admissible, unless the accused establishes that 
his legitimate expectations of privacy have been violated. Mere 
allegations of ownership do not suffice. In Rakas, the Supreme 
Court declared, "The proponent of a motion to suppress has the 
burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rightis were 
violated by the challenged search or seizure." 439 U.S. 131 n. 1. 
The Rakas Court rejected the defendants1 claim, "since the/ [the 
defendants] made no showing that they had any legitimate 
expectation of privacy" in the searched vehicle. Xd. at 148. 
gee also Rawlins v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 101, 104 (1980) (the 
defendant must prove not only that the search was illegal, but 
also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
object searched); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 
(1980) (no valid fourth amendment claim absent "a factual 
finding" that defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the area searched); United States v. Ericksonf 732 F.2d 788, 
790 (10th Cir. 1984) (fourth amendment claim regarding search of 
airplane depended upon whether the defendant "sufficiently showed 
lawful possession or control to confer standing," and was 
dismissed because he had "failed to show lawful possession of the 
plane giving rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy"); 
United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(no standing, because defendant did not prove that he had 
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l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy in automobile); S tate v. 
Bot te l son , 102 Idaho 90, , 625 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981) 
("defendant had the burden of proving that he had a l eg i t imate 
expectat ion of privacy in the Pontiac"); People v. Pearson, 190 
Colo. 313 , , 546 P.2d 1259, 1264 (1976) (to "establ ish 
standing to challenge a search and se izure , the challenger has 
the burden of a l l eg ing and proving that he has a reasonable 
expectat ion of privacy"); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE S 11.3 
(1978) ("The burden i s on the defendant t o show that he had 
lawful possess ion of the auto or was otherwise present t h e r e i n ) . 
Prior to the Supreme Court's adoption of "the 
l eg i t imate expectat ion of privacy" standard in Rakas v. I l l i n o i s f 
many courts struggled t o find a v a l i d rule for determining 
whether a defendant had standing to ra i se a fourth amendment 
claim. At pages 17-18 of h i s br ief , defendant c i t e s s i x , pre-
i 
Rakas, federal c i r c u i t court cases which he claims support h i s 
view that , by merely a l l eg ing ownership of an objec t , an 
individual has standing to challenge the search of that objec t . 
To the extent that these cases tend t o suggest that unsupported 
a l l e g a t i o n s of ownership are s u f f i c i e n t to confer fourth 
amendment standing, they are no longer good lav^ in the federal 
system today. 
Defendant c i t e s , for example, two cas^s—United S ta te s 
v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1267-69 (9th Cir. 1977) and United 
fftates v. Graham, 391 F.2d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 1968) , c e r t , denied 
393 U.S. 941 (1968)—which s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i e d on the rule of 
standing a r t i c u l a t e d in Jones v. United S t a t e s , 362 U.S. 257 
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(I960). Defendant concedes, however, that Jones was overruled by 
the Supreme Court in Rakas and in United States v. Salvucci, and 
that the Jones standard is no longer valid today. 
In another case cited by defendant, Cotton v. United 
States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied personal property law concepts to find that the 
thief of an automobile had standing to object to its search, 
stating, MOlne whose possession is wrongful is entitled to 
protection against all who do not have a paramount right to 
possession." Ijd. at 391. This property law approach, was 
repudiated in Rakasf however, where the Supreme Court declared 
that the distinctions developed in property and tort law ought 
not to control in the deciding of fourth amendment standing 
issues. 439 U.S. at 143. And Cotton has been severely 
criticized by courts and commentators alike. See e.g., State v. 
Boutot, 325 A.2d 34, 41 (Me. 1974) (attacking Cotton on grounds 
that "the question which determines the thieffs standing is not 
whether he has gained some proprietary interest in the property 
greater than that of anyone but the true owner but, rather, 
whether the search was of an area where, under all the 
circumstances, the thief had a reasonable expectation of freedom 
from government intrusion"); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE S 
11.3 (1978) (criticizing the Cotton court's application of 
property law concepts to fourth amendment issues1. 
Defendant also relies on Unites States v. Simpson, 346 
F.2d 291, 294 (10th Cir. 1965), where the Tenth Circuit Court, 
struggling with the problem that the police had conducted an 
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i l l e g a l search without any knowledge that the v e h i c l e had been 
s to l en and only afterwards discovered t h i s to be the case , 
suggested that the so le prerequis i te to achieving standing i s 
that the defendant claim a proprietary or possessory i n t e r e s t in 
the se ized property. I t i s , however, c l ear ly not the pos i t ion of 
the Tenth Circuit Court today that unfounded a l l e g a t i o n s of 
ownership are s u f f i c i e n t to confer standing. See United S ta te s 
y, Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 1984); United S ta te s v. 
Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984) (cases holding that 
the defendant must prove that h i s l eg i t imate expectat ions of 
privacy have been v i o l a t e d ) . 
In support of h i s contention that h i s unsubstantiated 
claim to ownership of the 1973 Mustang automatical ly e s tab l i shed 
h i s standing t o challenge the po l ice examination of the VIN on 
the safety standard s t i c k e r , defendant c i t e s dictum from State v. 
Montavne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958 (1966) in which the Utah 
Supreme Court said that "the so le prerequis i te i s that he [the 
defendant] claim a proprietary or possessory i n t e r e s t in the 
searched or se ized property." 414 P.2d at 960. Taken out of i t s 
context , t h i s statement tends to support defendant's p o s i t i o n . 
The re s t of the Hontayne opinion makes i t c l e a r , however, that 
the claim of ownership must be v a l i d and that the defendant has 
the burden of proving i t s v a l i d i t y . The Utah ^Supreme Court 
declared in Montayne: 
In approaching the problem of standing, 
the or ig in and nature of the rule concerning 
suppression should be noted. Evidence i s 
suppressed or excluded only if the same was 
obtained by a v i o l a t i o n of the Fourth Amendment, 
designed to protect a person1 s right to 
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privacy and property. Evidence sought to be 
ex eluded i s admi j>_si bl je,, h o w e v e r " unt i l the 
accused has es tabl i shed that his r ights under 
tjjg, ru le have been invaded. 
Xd. (emphasis added). This Court further s t a t ed : 
Therefore, i t i s e n t i r e l y proper to require 
of one who seeks to challenge the l e g a l i t y of 
a search as a basis for suppressing relevant 
evidence tha t he a l l eges , , and if the a l l ega t ion 
be disputed tha t he es tab l ish^_tha t he himself 
was a victim of an invasion of privacy. Under 
t h i s philosophy, the appel lant has no standing 
because he was not a victim of an invasion 
of privacy. 
Id. In Montayne, the Utah Supreme Court denied the defendant 
standing to challenge the search of the vehicle and, taker as a 
whole, the Montayne decision lends no support to defendant 's 
argument tha t h is naked claim of ownership e n t i t l e s him to 
standing. 
Defendant at tempts to dis t inguish S ta te v. Valdez, 689 
P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984), and S ta te v. Pu rce l l , 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 
1978) in which the Utah Supreme Court held t ha t there was no 
standing to challenge the search of vehic les tha t the defendants 
did not lawfully possess. These attempts are unpersuasive. 
F i r s t , contrary to the claim made by defendant, there i s no 
indica t ion tha t the defendant in Purcell ever conceded t ha t the 
searched vehicle was s to len . On the issue of standing, the 
Court s ta ted only: 
I t i s t o be noted a t the outset tha t t h i s 
appeal i s without merit for one very obvious 
reason, if for no other . Defendant simply 
lacks standing in court to a t tack the warrant 
as to the search of the s tolen automobile, 
since on the fac ts before us, defendant had 
absolutely no possessory or proprie tary 
i n t e r e s t there in that could have been invaded. 
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586 P. 2d at 443. On i t s f ace , Purcell appears ident i ca l to the 
present case: the defendant lacked standing because he f a i l e d to 
show that he had a l eg i t imate expectat ion of privacy in the 
s to l en v e h i c l e . Second, and perhaps more importantly, nothing in 
e i ther of these two cases suggests , as defendant seems t o 
b e l i e v e , that the i s sue of standing depends on whether or not the 
defendant has conceded that he lacked a v a l i 4 i n t e r e s t . Neither 
these two cases nor Montayne suggest a reluctance by the Utah 
Supreme Court to follow the w e l l - s e t t l e d rule that the defendant 
must prove he had a l eg i t imate expectat ion of privacy in the 
object searched. 
Defendant urges that requiring him to prove that he had 
a l eg i t imate expectat ion of privacy in the s to l en v e h i c l e would 
deny him his cons t i tu t iona l presumption of innocence. I t i s true 
that , i f defendant had been able to produce adequate evidence at 
the suppression hearing t o show that he had a l eg i t imate 
expectat ion of privacy in the 1973 Mustang, that same evidence 
would have tended t o e s t a b l i s h h i s innocence at t r i a l . I t cannot 
be sa id , however, that h i s presumption of innocence was v i o l a t e d . 
The presumption of innocence did take e f f e c t unt i l t r i a l , so 
requiring defendant at the suppression hearing to prove that h i s 
own l e g i t i m a t e expectat ion of privacy had been invaded did not 
v i o l a t e the presumption. See , e. g. . Bel l v. Wolfisht 441 U.S. 
520, 533 (1979) ("The presumption of innocence i s a doctrine that 
a l l o c a t e s the burden of proof in criminal t r i a l s . " I t has "no 
appl i ca t ion . . . before [the d e f e n d a n t s ] t r i a l has even 
begun."). Defendants f a i l u r e to e s t a b l i s h a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t 
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in the vehicle did not relieve the State of its burden of proving 
defendant guilty at trial. The jury was instructed that it could 
convict defendant only if the State proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt each element of the offenses charged (see R. 69-70). 
Because defendant could not show that his expectations of privacy 
had been violated, items of evidence which he claimed were ille-
gally seized were introduced at trial, but defendant was never 
required to prove anything at trialf and his presumption oE 
innocence was not violated* 
To the extent that the Utah Supreme Court has not 
clearly done so in prior decisions, the State urges this Court to 
adopt, as a matter of Utah Constitutional law, the "legitimate 
expectation of privacy" approach to determining standing. There 
is no reason why a criminal should be allowed to have relevant 
evidence excluded without showing that his legitimate 
expectations of privacy have been violated. This Court should 
follow what appears to be the unanimous rule of the courts in 
this nation today—a rule which this Court seems already to have 
adopted in Montayne, Pur cell and Valdez—, that a defendant does 
not have standing to complain of the seizure of evidence from a 
vehicle that he has stolen. In the present case, defendant had 
no legitimate privacy interest in concealing the vehicle 
identification number of the car that he had stolen, and he 
should not be allowed to elevate himself to a position of 
standing through assertions of ownership that are unsubstantiated 
and/or made in bad faith. Accordingly, the issue of unlawful 
search and seizure raised by defendant should be dismissed for 
want of standing. 
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B. ASSUMING DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE, 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS STILL LAWFUL. 
Defendant argues that the warrantless search of the 
v e h i c l e to obtain the VIN was a v i o l a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t s 
expectat ion of privacy. The search of the veh ic l e can be 
affirmed on two grounds: 1) defendant has no expectat ion of 
privacy in the VIN, and 2) probable cause e x i s t e d for a 
warrantless search. 
In New York v. Class , U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 96 0 
(1986) the United S ta te s Supreme Court recent ly ruled that no 
reasonable expectat ion of privacy e x i s t s in the VIN. Id . at 966. 
The fac tors that general ly diminish the 
reasonable expectat ion of privacy ih 
automobiles are appl icable a f o r t i o r i to 
the VIN. As we have discussed abov^, the 
VIN plays an important part in the pervasive 
regulat ion by the government of the 
automobile. A motorist must surely expect 
that such regulat ion w i l l on occasion 
require the State to determine the VJIN 
of h is or her v e h i c l e , and the indiv idual f s 
reasonable expectat ion of privacy in| the 
VIN i s thereby diminished. 
JLd. at 966. 
In the ins tant case Detect ive Robisoh received a c a l l 
from the owner of a v e h i c l e which was a l leged ^o have been s to l en 
(R. 230) . The de tec t ive went t o the l oca t ion of the veh i c l e and 
ran a check on the l i c e n s e number. As a resultj: of the check, the 
o f f i c er learned the v e h i c l e was reg i s tered t o the defendant (R. 
233) . After rece iv ing further information from the owner, i . e . 
that the car had d i s t i n c t i v e arm r e s t s , t i e downs on the hood, a 
black racing s tr ipe on the hood and s ides of the car, and a scoop 
I 
on the front of the car, the d e t e c t i v e returned t o the car (R. 
- 2 3 -
234). The detective then opened the car door to determine if the 
VIN on the safety sticker on the door matched the VIN on the 
dashboard (R. 235). It is clear that the only reason the 
detective entered the car was to examine the VIN. Further, Kip 
Ingersoll, an investigator with the Motor Vehicle Business 
Administration, who was with Detective Robison when she opened 
the car door, testified that there are usually two or more places 
on the vehicle where the VIN is stamped (R. 269). In the present 
case the officers possessed information that a car had been 
stolen, and the prior owner gave the officers a detailed 
description of the vehicle. The car examined by the officers 
matched the description given by the owner, and the fact that the 
VIN on the dashboard did not match the stolen vehicle made it 
reasonable for the officers to verify the other VINs on the 
vehicle. 
Furthermore, the warrantless search of the vehicle was 
justified on the basis of probable cause. A "warrantless vehicle 
search is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment if probable 
cause for a search exists." State v. Dorsey, 49 Utah Adv. Rep. 
21, 22 (Dec. 31, 1986). 
Probable cause e x i s t s where "the f ac t s and 
circumstances within the i r [the off icers 13 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] su f f i c i en t 
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief tha t " an offense has 
been or i s being committed. 
I d . a t 22, c i t i ng Brinegar v. United S t a t e s , 338 U.S. a t 175-76. 
The determination of whether probable cause 
e x i s t s , therefore , depends upon an examination 
of a l l the information ava i lab le to the 
searching off icer in l i gh t of the circumstances 
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as they existed a t the time the search was 
made. The t r i a l court1 s f indings as to the 
fac ts and circumstances pertaining to probable 
cause wil l not be overturned on appeal unless 
i t appears tha t the t r i a l court c lea r ly erred. 
porsey, 49 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 23 (c i t a t ions omitted). 
Based upon the following f a c t s , probable cause exis ted 
to search the veh ic le : 1) the owner of a vehicle reported that 
h i s car had been s tolen and tha t he thought i t was located a t 
7442 Gardenia Avenue (R. 230-31) , 2) he provided police of f icers 
with a descr ipt ion of the car : a gold, yellpw Mach I Mustang 
with black racing s t r ipes (R. 231), armrests which had been 
"redone* and which were "very d i s t i n c t i v e frcwn the res t of the 
car", a black racing s t r i pe on the hood of the car , a "scoop" on 
the hood of the car , and "tie-downs" on the hood (R. 234), 3) a 
Mach I Mustang matching the above descriptiori was found a t 7442 
Gardenia Avenue (R. 232-34). The off icers were confronted with a 
dilemma in the ins tan t case, the descript ion given by the owner 
of the s tolen vehicle matched the vehicle located a t 7442 
Gardenia Avenue; however, the VIN on the dashboard did not match 
tha t of the s tolen vehic le . Faced with t h i s dilemma, the 
of f icers had probable cause to search for a der iva t ive VIN 
stamped on the vehicle in a secre t locat ion not v i s i b l e to the 
public (R. 269). 
Because defendant has no expectation of privacy in the 
VIN, and furthermore because probable cause exis ted to search the 
car, the search of the vehicle was lawful. 
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POINT I I I 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONTENTION THAT JURORS SAW HIM IN SHACKLES 
OR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OTHERWISE DENIED 
HIM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
Defendant contends t h a t , pr ior t o the j u r y ' s 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s , members of t h e jury saw him under p r e j u d i c i a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r 
t r i a l . He c l a i m s t h a t t h e j u r o r s saw him " s h a c k l e d , " t h a t one 
juror saw him a s he was be ing l e d down a f l i g h t of s t a i r s by a 
uniformed o f f i c e r , and t h a t another juror saw him e n t e r i n g a 
p o l i c e car . Assuming arguendo tha t d e f e n d a n t ' s be ing seen by 
members of t h e jury under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s he has d e s c r i b e d 
would c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant the r e v e r s a l 
of h i s c o n v i c t i o n , d e f e n d a n t ' s argument must f a i l b e c a u s e , 
contrary t o h i s m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the r e c o r d , defendant was 
never seen by j u r o r s under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s he has d e s c r i b e d . 
There i s no record e v i d e n c e tha t defendant was seen i n s h a c k l e s , 
t h a t he was seen i n t h e company of a uniformed o f f i c e r , or t h a t 
he was seen under c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t might o t h e r w i s e have been 
p r e j u d i c i a l t o him. 
On t h e f i n a l day of d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l , counse l made 
t h e i r c l o s i n g arguments and r e s t e d j u s t pr ior t o l u n c h t i m e . The 
c o u r t dec ided t h a t t h e jury should begin i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n a f t e r 
l u n c h . In order t h a t the jury not s e e defendant under s u g g e s t i v e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e b a i l i f f l e d t h e jury out of t h e courthouse and 
t h e n , a f t e r the b u i l d i n g had c l e a r e d , defendant was e s c o r t e d out 
by a p r i s o n o f f i c e r . As defendant and h i s e s c o r t were walking 
down the s t e p s of the c o u r t h o u s e , however, the jury members drove 
by in a s t a t i o n wagon. 
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Later, af ter the jury had rendered i t s ve rd ic t , Judge 
Dee asked the jury members about what they might have seen on 
t h e i r way to lunch. One ju ro r , Ms. Bragg, said she saw defendant 
on the s t a i r s in the company of a man who was wearing a su i t (R. 
328). Another ju ro r , Ms. Broadhead, saw defendant walking in the 
d i rec t ion of what turned out to be a police car .? Contrary to 
defendant 's representa t ions , nothing in the record suggests t ha t 
the officer accompanying defendant was wearing a uniform. All 
indica t ions are t ha t , consis tent with the normal pract ice in the 
Third D i s t r i c t Court, defendant 's escort was dressed in a p l a in -
clothes su i t (R. 328, 338). There i s a lso no evidence tha t 
defendant was •'shackled" or in handcuffs; or t h a t , if he was 
handcuffed, the ju rors who saw him were in any posi t ion to no-
t i c e , or did in fact not ice , the handcuffs.8 No evidence 
suggests t ha t the car toward which defendant vias walking had 
markings indicat ing that i t was a police veh ic le , or tha t Juror 
Broadhead, who saw defendant walking toward the car, had any 
idea that he was planning to enter the veh ic le , or tha t he was 
being required to do so as a matter of incarcerat ion (see R. 
328-29). I t i s clear that defendant, himself, was wearing 
p la inc lo thes and not prison garb (R. 332). 
7 in t h i s brief a t appendix B i s included the xtecord of Judge 
Dee's questioning of the j u r o r s . 
8 i t i s i n t e re s t ing t o note tha t defendant ever* admits in h i s 
brief tha t the record i s not clear that he was handcuffed (App. 
Br. 29) , and then three pages l a t e r defendant erroneously s t a t e s 
that two ju ro r s saw the defendant handcuffed (App. Br. 32). 
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Had the jurors t ru ly seen defendant in prison garb and 
shackles , being forced by uniformed guards to enter what was 
p la in ly a po l ice or prison v e h i c l e , there might have been an 
i s s u e as to whether h i s right to a fa i r t r i a l had been v i o l a t e d . 
This did not occur in the present case , however. Defendant, who 
was in p la inc lo thes was seen br i e f ly as he walked with a man, who 
was a l s o in p l a i n c l o t h e s , down some s t a i r s and in the d i r e c t i o n 
of a v e h i c l e which may or may not have had p o l i c e markings on i t . 
The evidence against defendant was overwhelming—he does not 
attempt to argue that i t was insuf f i c ient—and both of the jurors 
involved t e s t i f i e d that the ir seeing defendant on that occasion 
had no e f f ec t upon their de l iberat ions (R. 328-29) . Because 
there was no reasonable l i k e l i h o o d of prejudice to defendant, 
Judge Dee's rul ing that there was no grounds for a m i s t r i a l was 
proper. Defendant's argument should be re jec ted . See State v. 
Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985) ( t h i s Court w i l l not 
reverse a criminal convic t ion unless there i s a substant ia l 
l i k e l i h o o d that the defendant was prejudiced, "in the sense that 
there i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d t h a t , absent the challenged 
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error , there would have been a d i f ferent r e s u l t " ) . 9 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF 
BOTH THEFT AND POSSESSION OF A STOLEN 
VEHICLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Before the judge dismissed the jury to de l iberate in 
the instant case , the defendant objected to ins truct ion number 
4 1 0 on the grounds that the ins truc t ion should s t a t e that 
possess ion of a s to len v e h i c l e i s a l e s s e r included offense of 
the f t (R. 324) . Although the record does not d i s c l o s e the 
reasons for the t r i a l court 1 s ru l ing , the judge permitted 
ins truc t ion number 4 without the l e s s e r included offense 
ins truc t ion to go to the jury (R. 70) . On appeal defendant 
claims t h i s ruling was erroneous. 
Cit ing relevant provis ions from the Utah Code and case 
law which includes the Utah Supreme Court's rul ings in State v. 
H i l l , 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) and State v. Bradley, 19 Utah Adv. 
9 In support of h i s argument that a mis tr ia l should have been 
granted, defendant c i t e s E s t e l l e v. Will iams, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976), Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) , and other cases 
holding that i t i s unconst i tut ional for s t a t e s to require that a 
defendant appear before the jury in prison garb and chains. 
These cases are of l i t t l e relevance to the present i s s u e , 
because: (1) the State in the instant case—rather than require 
that defendant appear before the jury in prison garb—provided 
for defendant's being dressed in p la inc lo thes and made every 
e f for t to insure that defendant would not be seen by jurors under 
circumstances that could be prejudic ia l to him; (2) defendant was 
in fact never seen wearing prison a t t i r e ; (3) there i s no 
evidence that defendant was ever seen wearing handcuffs; (4) the 
o f f i c e r who was seen accompanying defendant was qu i te cer ta in ly 
wearing p l a i n c l o t h e s ; and (5) there were no other circumstances 
tending to suggest that d e f e n d a n t s right to a fa i r t r i a l had 
been v i o l a t e d . 
10 Instruct ion number 4 provided the ins truc t ion on possess ion of 
a s to l en v e h i c l e . 
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Rep. 4 (Sept. 2 3 , 1985) , defendant argues that possess ion i s a 
l e s s e r included offense of the f t and that i t was improper for the 
jury to convict him of both thef t of a motor v e h i c l e and 
possess ion of that v e h i c l e . Under the circumstances of the 
present case , defendant was properly convicted of both thef t and 
possess ion of a s t o l e n v e h i c l e . 
A Hi l l ana lys i s i s not necessary under the 
circumstances of t h i s case s ince t h i s case involved, in a l ega l 
sense , two d i s t i n c t a c t s by defendant — one cons t i tu ted t h e f t 
and the other possess ion of a s to l en v e h i c l e . Whether a greater-
l e s s e r offense r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s in a part icular case under 
e i ther Hi l l or S ta te v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) (which 
s e t s forth the t e s t to determine whether a defendant i s e n t i t l e d 
to a requested l e s s e r included offense i n s t r u c t i o n ) , i s an i s sue 
only where a s i n g l e act of the defendant i s involved. For 
example, in a criminal homicide case the quest ion may be whether 
the defendant's s i n g l e act of k i l l i n g cons t i tu ted second degree 
murder or manslaughter (a l e s s e r included offense of second 
degree murder). If the defendant had committed two a c t s of 
k i l l i n g within a s ing le criminal episode, one c o n s t i t u t i n g second 
degree murder and the other manslaughter, the defendant could not 
s u c c e s s f u l l y argue that , because the two o f fenses f a l l within the 
g r e a t e r - l e s s e r offense r e l a t i o n s h i p , he could be convicted of 
only one of fense . I t i s c lear that if "the crimes were a r e s u l t 
of separate and d i s t i n c t a c t s that resu l ted in separate and 
d i s t i n c t crimes," a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for 
each of the o f fenses ar i s ing out of a s i n g l e criminal episode. 
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State v, O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (1986). See a l so State v. 
J o l i v e t , 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986) j S ta te v. Porter, 705 P.2d 
1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) . 
Although the defendant c i t e s numerous cases holding 
that an individual could not be convicted of both the f t and 
possess ion , the defendants in those cases were found in 
possess ion of s to len goods not long after they had taken them. 
The possess ion grew out of, and was inc idental t o , the t h e f t s 
involved. However, when there i s evidence of complete 
divorcement between the thef t and a subsequent rece iv ing , such as 
when the th ie f has disposed of the property and subsequently 
rece ives i t back in a transact ion separate from the or ig inal 
t h e f t , convict ion on both charges would be proper. People v. 
Jarami l lo , 129 Cal. Rptr. 306, 548 P. 2d 706 (1976); People v. 
Kyllonen, 402 Mich. 135, 262 N.W.2d 2 (1978).j 
In defendant's case , the information charged defendant 
with two separate crimes on d i f f erent dates : the f t on June 16, 
1981, and possess ion of a s to l en veh ic l e on Jitne 6, 1985. The 
jury in s t ruc t ions a lso charged defendant with committing the 
thef t on June 16 , 1981 (R. 6 9 ) , and committing the crime of 
possess ion of s to len property on June 6 , 1985 (R. 70) . 
The evidence in defendant's case e s tab l i shed that 
defendant s t o l e the 1973 Mustang from State Auto Sa le s in June of 
1981 (R. 185-89) . The record does not d i s c l o s e the exact date , 
but sometime within the next year or two defendant was imprisoned 
I 
in the Utah State Prison for s t e a l i n g a truck ^alued at around 
$80,000.00 (R. 348) . $£& a l so fflate v. Laroccj), 665 P.2d 1273 
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(Utah 1983) ( th i s same defendant appeals h i s convict ion for thef t 
of truck) . Prior to entering the State Prison for s t e a l i n g the 
truck, defendant del ivered the 1973 Mustang t o h i s brother- in -
law, Darrel Norman (R. 293) . Defendant was re leased from prison 
in February of 1985; and in May of 1985, was seen driving the 
s t o l e n Mustang (R. 191, 348) . A short time l a t e r defendant was 
arres ted , and he admitted being in possess ion of the Mustang, 
which was parked in front of h i s home (R. 215, 232, 239) . 
The thef t and the possess ion are temporarily d i s t a n t 
from one another, and interrupted by the years that defendant 
spent in prison and the de l ivery of the car to h i s brother- in-
law. Defendant's conscious dec i s ion t o , upon being re leased from 
prison, again take possess ion of the v e h i c l e and begin using i t 
for h i s own purposes was an act addit ional t o , and d i s t i n c t from, 
the or ig inal thef t that occurred four years e a r l i e r . For t h i s 
reason, Judge Dee properly ruled that as a matter of law 
defendant could be convicted of both s t e a l i n g and possess ing the 
1973 Mustang.11 
People v. Malmut, 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 782 
(1971) i s helpful to the present case. There, the defendant was 
charged with and convicted of committing separate transact ions on 
d i f f erent dates : grand thef t on December 8 , 1968, and v i o l a t i o n 
of S10851 of the Cal i fornia Vehic le Code (driving an automobile 
without the owner's permission) on February 5 , 1969. The Malmut 
11 I t appears to the State that these crimes are not part of a 
s ing l e criminal episode; however i t i s not necessary for t h i s 
Court to reach t h i s i s s u e , t h i s court need only find that the two 
crimes were not part of the same a c t . 
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court stated: 
Here, there was not only a lapse of a 
substantial period of time (62 days), 
but there was also a showing that the 
vehicle was not being driven in one 
continuous journey away from the 
locus of the theft. The driving charge 
was in an entirely different location 
and obviously for purposes unconnected 
with the original taking. Moreover, not 
only was there a switch in license plates 
and registration slip, but there was also 
a placement of the motor and removal of the 
serial numbers from the body of the car — 
combined operations which would be considered 
a major alteration of the vehicle. 
Id. at 784. 
In Malmut the Court found defendant guilty of both 
crimes based upon the lapse of time, alone, between the theft and 
when defendant was seen with the altered vehicle. The present 
case, in contrast, involves a complete divorcement between the 
theft and possession wherein defendant actually relinquished the 
property and received it back at a later time. 
Assuming arguendo, this Court finds that the defendant 
did not commit two separate acts, but instead one continuous act, 
the State urges this Court to eliminate the judgment of the lower 
court on the possession charge insofar as the penalty alone is 
concerned. 
The State recognizes that Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(1) 
(1978) provides in part: 
"When the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish 
offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, 
the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision." 
This provision is similar to Cal. Penal Code § 654 (West 1986) 
which provides in part: 
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An act or omission which i s made punishable 
in d i f f erent ways by d i f ferent provis ions of 
t h i s Code may be punished under e i ther of such 
prov i s ions , but in no case can i t be punished 
under more than one. 
The Cal i fornia Supreme Court has ruled that § 654 
forbids mult iple punishment, but not mult ip le conv ic t ions , and 
"conduct giving r i s e to more than one offense within the meaning 
of the s t a t u t e may r e s u l t in i n i t i a l convict ion of both crimes, 
only one of which, the more ser ious o f f ense , may be punished," 
People v. McFarland, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 481 , 376 P.2d 449, 457 
(1962); In Re Wright, 56 Cal. Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998 (1967) . 
The appropriate method to e l iminate mult ip le punishment 
on mult iple convic t ions i s t o stay execution of sentence en the 
count carrying the l e s s e r degree of punishment unt i l completion 
of the sentence on the other count. People v. N i l e s , 227 
Cal.App.2d 749, 756, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1964); In Re Wright, 65 
Cal.2d 650, 56 Cal. Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998 (1967); People v. 
McFarland, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962). "tTlhis 
procedure f o r e c l o s e s a defendant going completely free in the 
event that upon appeal the convict ion on e i ther offense be 
declared i n v a l i d . " People v. Malmut, 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 93 
Cal. Rptr. 782, 785; S,ee a l so People v. Pearson, 42 Cal.3d 351 , 
, 228 Cal. Rptr. 509, 514, 721 P. 2d 595, 600 (1986) c i t i n g 
N i l e s , 227 Cal.App.2d at 756, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 . The Cal i fornia 
Courts have protected the defendant by ruling that the Adult 
Authority should not consider the convict ion with the stayed 
sentence in determining the defendant's parole date . flcFarland, 
26 Cal. Rptr. at 481 , 376 P.2d at 481. Further, a court may not 
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enhance a defendant 's sentence because of a stayed conviction. 
The stayed conviction should be formally dismissed on completion 
of the defendant 's sentence and parole on the conviction for 
which he i s to be punished; Pearson, n.4 42 Cal.3d a t , 228 
Cal. Rptr. at 516f 721 P. 2d a t 602. 
In the ins tan t case, should t h i s cburt find tha t thef t 
and possession cons t i tu te the same act which may be punished in 
d i f ferent ways under di f ferent provisions of the code, the S ta te 
urges t h i s Court to i n t e rp re t § 76-1-402 l ike California has 
in terpre ted S 654, i . e . tha t S 76-1-402 proh ib i t s mult iple 
punishments, not mult iple convict ions. The sentence on the 
possession charge should then be stayed pending completion of the 
sentence on the the f t , a t tha t time the possession conviction 
should be dismissed. This rul ing should further contain a caveat 
t ha t the stayed sentence may not be used by the Department of 
Corrections to determine defendant 's date of parole , nor may i t 
be used to enhance any future sentence given to defendant. 
Should t h i s Court conclude, that defendant could not be 
convicted of both offenses, then the conviction for possession 
should be vacated and the theft conviction affirmed. 
In S ta te v. H i l l , 674 P. 2d 96 (Utah 1983), t h i s court 
explained the proper remedy for s i t ua t ions in which a criminal 
has been convicted of both a greater and a leaser included 
offense: 
When a defendant has been improperly 
convicted of both a greater and a 
lesser offense, it is appropriate to 
regard the conviction on the lesser 
offense as mere surplusage, which 
does not invalidate the conviction 
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and sentence on the greater offense. 
United States v. Howard, 507 F.2d 559 
(8th Cir. 1974). 
674 P.2d at 98. Accord Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619, 621 
(Alaska App. 1981); People y. Jackson, Colo. , 627 P.2d 
741 (1981). In no event is defendant entitled to have this theft 
conviction overturned. 
Two separate situations involving lesser included 
offense issues commonly arise. In the first situation, the 
defendant is charged with both the greater and the lesser 
offense. The jury is instructed as to the elements of both 
offenses and finds the defendant guilty of both, when the 
defendant could properly have been convicted of only one of the 
offenses. These were the circumstances in State v. Hill, 674 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1983); and, as a proper remedy, the Court should 
invalidate the conviction for the lesser offense and affirm the 
conviction for the greater. 674 P.2d at 98. In the second 
situation, the jury is improperly instructed, over the 
defendant's objection, that it must either convict the defendant 
of the greater offense or acquit him. The jury, which has never 
been allowed to consider the possibility that the defendant may 
have been guilty of a lesser offense instead of the greater, 
convicts the defendant of the greater offense. These latter 
circumstances arose in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), 
and here the defendant's remedy is to have his conviction for the 
greater offense reversed and remanded. 
Attempting to apply both Hill and Baker remedies to 
this present case, defendant urges that he is entitled to have 
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h i s convict ion on the l e s s e r possess ion charge vacated and t o 
have the greater theft convict ion remanded for r e t r i a l . The 
present case , however, i s p la in ly a Hi l l type of case , where both 
the greater and l e s s e r of fenses went to the jury, and the 
defendant was convicted of both. Baker i s inoppos i te , and 
d e f e n d a n t s attempts to gain a double remedy through the 
appl i ca t ion of both Hi l l and Baker i s inappropriate. At most, 
defendant i s e n t i t l e d to have h is convict ion for possess ion 
vacated, an the thef t convict ion affirmed. ftill, 674 P.2d at 98. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the S ta te requests t h i s Court 
to affirm the t r i a l court and t o uphold the convic t ions for the f t 
and possess ion of a s to l en v e h i c l e . 
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other chances if you want to look at my chambers later on. 
But we'll be in recess on this case until 2:00 p.m. 
(Whereupon, court recessed 
at 12:15 p.m. and reconvened at 2:12 p.m. i0 chambers with 
Court and counsel present.) 
THE COURT: Hi, Mrs. Lembke. Come on in. 
The record should show that Mrs, Lembke, one 
of the jurors in the case before the Court, is in chambers 
with the lawyer for the defendant and the prosecutor 
because there was an observed conversation between the 
juror and one of the persons out in the hall who is called 
as a witness for the prosecution. And there is a question 
raised about the conversation, whether you talked with this 
witness about the case. 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
THE COURT: What were you talking about, 
if you don't mind us finding out about it? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Well, first of all, he 
pulled the light switch in the hall and had mentioned that 
it worked, and then he did the other switch. And then 
he just was saying he hoped it didn't - - the case didn't 
go long, that he was going to Eureka, just driving down 
there, where I lived. Just general conversation. Nothing 
at all about the case. 
THE COURT: Did you know who he was? 
CGO'*.^  
21. 
'I JUROR LEMBKE: I thought I recognized 
2 his sweater. We shared an ashtray. 
31 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think 
*| that there's anything else about the conversation as far 
5| as that's concerned. It's a question of friendliness or 
6 j whatever that sometimes raises a question about what you 
7 would think of him as a witness or if he was called or 
8 I not called, whatever. We have to be very careful about 
9 1 that sort of thing. 
10 JUROR LEMBKE: I understand. 
11 THE COURT: I guess what we ought to do 
12 is isolate everybody from everybody in terms of that 
13 sort of thing. Maybe the jurors should go down to the 
14 other end of the hall, the City end, while people are 
15 out in the hall. You don't know who they are, and I don't 
16 know who they are. And that would end speculation. 
17I Do you feel comfortable about the whole thing? 
18 Otherwise - -
10 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. 
20 I THE COURT: Okay. As long as that was 
21 the substance of your conversation. 
22 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. The case wasn't 
23 mentioned at all. 
24 MR. H0RT0N: Do you feel you can still 
25 be fair to both sides and not be influenced by the 
2Z-
1 conversation out in the hall? 
2I JUROR LEMBKE: Yes, because we didnft 
3I talk about anything involving anything. I mean I don't 
* know why he's here. I don't, you know, other than the 
6] fact he is a witness. I have no idea. 
el MR. HORTON: Do you feel you could 
7 weigh his testimony the same as any other witnesses if 
8 he testifies and he is subject to cross-examination and 
0 so forth? 
10 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. 
11 MS. REMAL: Do you feefL as though the 
12 fact you had this conversation makes him more believable -
13 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
14 MS. REMAL: - - because you already 
15 talked to him? 
16 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
17 He did mention one thing. That he was 
18 surprised at the questions that were asked. And that 
19 he was - - he was surprised, and that he> himself, would 
20 have said, yes, when you asked if you would believe a 
21 policeman more than any other person. That was the only 
22 comment that was made. And - - and I didn't - - when the 
23 judge asked if we would believe a policeman more than any 
24 other person, and he said he probably would have raised 




























THE COURT: If he had been a juror? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Had he been a juror, 
that would be his, you know - -
MS. REMAL: So you did have that bit of 
conversation concerning the jury selection? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Yeah. He did say that. 
I made no comment. 
MS. REMAL: Was there any other discussion 
about the questions asked on jury selection or anything 
like that? 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. And he asked me if 
I had ever served on a jury before, and I said, "No." 
THE COURT: Any other jurors there while 
all of this was going on? 
JUROR LEMBKE: One. The girl sitting 
next to me there. As he was walking up to use the ashtray, 
she left, and he used the ashtray. 1 
THE COURT: The young lady on your left? 
JUROR LEMBKE: On my right. The blonde. 
(Indicating.) 
THE COURT: Okay. 
JUROR LEMBKE: Or she left just as he was 
walking by. The one right there. We were out there 
before - -
THE COURT: Okay. 
30 
MR. HORTON: The comment that he made to 
you about the police officer, would that affect your 
deliberation in any way? 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Th^nk you. You can 
sit back in the jury box. 
(Whereupon, Juror Lembke 
left the chambers.) 
Miss Remal, you can make your motion. 
MS. REMAL: Your HonorL I would move 
for a mistrial. I'm sure that Mrs. Lembke didn't mean 
anything by her conversation with the witness, but I'm 
still concerned that there was a little bit of conversation 
pertaining to the case, at least to the jury selection, 
that went on, and the comment about him saying that he 
would have answered the question differently than she 
apparently did. I'm just a little concerned there may be 
some influence depending on that. And as I said before, 
the fact that she had this conversation with him, I'm 
afraid that even though not consciously she may just find 
him more believable because she may think he's a nice guy, 
having had this conversation. And I'm a little bit 
concerned about that. 
THE COURT; Mr. Horton? 
MR. HORTON: From the limited conversation 
G-->^ 
JO. 
1 J they had and the fact she's been in here and questioned 
2 about it, my impression would be if anything she would 
31 try to compensate in favor of the defense. And I don't 
4 J think there's a basis for a mistrial, so we would oppose 
6 J the motion at this time. 
6 THE COURT: My perception of the 
7 converstation's content and the response of the juror to 
8 I the questions about the conversation leads the Court to 
9I believe there's no basis for a mistrial. 
10 Motion is denied. 
11 I M S . REMAL: Well - -
12 THE COURT: I guess we can do - -
13 MS. REMAL: Do i t ? 
14 I THE COURT: I guess we can go do it. 
15 Wait. Wait. Wait. 
16I M S . REMAL: Your Honor, I would like to 
17I renew my Motion to Supress the evidence that was taken as 
18I a result of the search of the car on the day of Mr. Larocco ?s 
19 arrest and just make it clear to the court there's a 
20 continuing objection to the evidence obtained as a result 
21 of that search, so I don't have to jump up and down through 
22 the trial. 
23 THE COURT: Motion is denied, and the 
24 ruling of the Court you already have. 






























THE COURT: Did that have any influence 
on your determination in this case? 
You're shaking your head, Miss Bragg. It didn't 
have any effect - -
JUROR BRAGG: No. 
THE COURT: - - on your decision in the 
case, influence your deliberations? 1 
JUROR BRAGG: No. 
THE COURT: Miss Broadhead, how about 
you? 
JUROR BROADHEAD: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else see him get into 
a police car? 
All right. A?^fi^l5^eAccuse^- Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the jury was 
excused at 3:54 p.m.) 
THE COURT: What do you want to do about 
sentencing? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Mr. Larocco has 
indicated that he would prefer to be sentenced at a later 
date. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. REMAL: We ask that a pre-sentence 
report be prepared. 
coon::9 
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showing that he was in custody. And I wondered whether any 
of you saw that. I suppose what I'm saying is the bailiff 
should have made sure that situation didn't occur. That's 
what the complaint is. 
Any of you see the defendant getting into a 
police car? 
JUROR BRAGG: I saw him, but I didn't 
see him go get into a police car. I saw him go downstairs, 
but he was with a guy with a suit on. 
THE COURT: Just walking down the stairs? 
JUROR BRAGG: Yeah. 
JUROR BROADHEAD: I saw him when he 
was approaching the car. I probably wouldn't have seen 
him, but we were sitting in the back of a station wagon 
facing that way. 
THE COURT: You were sitting in the back 
of the station wagon? 
JUROR BROADHEAD: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Whose station wagon is that? 
THE BAILIFF: This lady here. (Indicating. 
THE COURT: Oh. You rode over to the 
China Village? 
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. They didn't want 
to freeze their toes. 
JUROR BROADHEAD: That's the only way I 
coos:: 
